Statistics on the wine market in countries where it is not traditionally produced or consumed are estimates using simple methods. In northeast Asia those statistics are exaggerated for a combination of several reasons. One is a labelling issue: imported bulk wine is able to be added to domestically produced wine without the front label having to declare the bottle may contain foreign product. Similar freedom applies to wine made from imported grape juice concentrate. A second (particularly in China) is a double-counting issue: domestic wine produced in one region of the country may be blended with wine produced in and packaged for final sale from another region, with both regions claiming it as their contribution to national wine output. A third possibility is a smuggling issue: some wine imports are unrecorded. These possibilities of the wine market being exaggerated are significant for firms seeking to sell in such countries, especially in the fast-growing ones of northeast Asia. This paper shows the extent to which estimates for the region could change for such indicators as per capita wine consumption, wine self-sufficiency and the region's share of global wine consumption, when alternative assumptions are made in response to these issues. (JEL classifications: F14, L66, Q13, Y10) 
I. Introduction
Statistics on the grape wine market in countries where such wine is not traditionally produced or consumed are often weak or non-existent. If domestic production is insignificant, consumption is usually assumed to be equal to imports less any re-exports (plus net changes in stocks if such data area available). Where there is enough domestic production for wine output statistics to be collected, however, there is a risk those statistics are exaggerated, for two possible reasons. One is if imported bulk wine or wine made from imported concentrated grape juice is able to be added to domestically produced wine without having to declare on the bottle's front label that the product in the bottle is of mixed or foreign origin (a labelling issue). The other (particularly in China) is a double-counting issue. It can occur when domestic wine produced in one region of the country is blended with wine produced in and packaged for final sale from another region: if both regions report that inter-regionally traded wine as a product of their region, there will be a degree of double counting in the national wine output data. When domestic production is so exaggerated, and domestic consumption is assumed (most obviously by analysts outside the country who are handicapped by a language barrier) to be domestic production plus net imports, then consumption also is overstated for that country.
It is also possible that apparent consumption estimates will be inaccurate to the extent that wine exports or imports are unrecorded when transported from one customs territory to
another. This smuggling issue is more likely to occur, the greater the difference between those territories' wine taxes.
A further confusion can arise if rice 'wine' consumption data are added to the data for grape wine consumption, as Euromonitor International does in its wine industry reports. Rice 'wine' is made in numerous Asian countries but each under a different name (sake in Japan, mijiu in China, cheongju in Korea, …). Typically it is at least 15% alcohol, is brewed differently than beer, and looks and is drunk like a clear spirit. If it is not to be put in a separate category, then for the purpose of analysing grape wine markets it could be included in the spirits category. In the rest of this paper the term 'wine' refers just to that made from fresh grapes or grape juice concentrate.
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The possibility of wine production and/or consumption 'data' being overstated is significant for several reasons. Obviously statistical agencies have an interest in ensuring the accuracy of their published data. Firms seeking to evaluate prospects for selling wine or other beverages in such countries also require accurate data. Furthermore, those concerned with health and social issues associated with excessive alcohol consumption want accurate data on both the aggregate quantity and -since social costs associated with excess consumption typically differ across beverage types -the mix of alcohols consumed.
Now is a good time to focus on this issue because a new wine regulation in Japan, (Anderson and Wittwer 2015) , and that policy reform has made it more lucrative for China's SARs to illicitly re-export wine to mainland China. The incentive for such illicit trade is beginning to diminish though, as more wine-exporting countries sign free trade agreements with China (most recently Australia following Chile and New Zealand, whose wine will be imported duty free by the end of this decade, and prospectively the European Union).
This paper reports grape wine production, consumption and trade estimates currently available for (mainland) China, Hong Kong, Macao and Japan, and then offers an alternative set of estimates to show how they change such indicators as per capita wine consumption, wine self-sufficiency, the share of wine in total alcohol consumption, and the region's share of global wine production and consumption. Those indicators are important because our alternative estimates suggest they are even lower than is commonly believed. This underscores the very considerable potential for growth in wine exports to greater China and HS2009, defined as "Fruit juices (including grape must) and vegetable juices, unfermented and not containing added spirit". 2 Japan's new standards on labelling and geographical indications for wine, sake and other alcohol beverages are detailed in National Tax Agency (2015) and Uytsel (2015) .
Japan, and has implications for wine sales in Hong Kong and Macao versus imports to those territories for re-export to mainland China.
The next section of the paper summarizes the commonly used statistics for the wine markets of these countries. Section III reports possible amendments to those statistics, showing how they would change under certain assumptions, and what those changes imply for various summary indicators of wine market trends over the past two decades in this important region. The final section draws out implications of the findings, especially for exporters of wine to northeast Asia.
II. Common sources of wine data for northeast Asia
International analysts without northeast Asian language skills typically rely on wine production data for the region from the UN' Anderson and Pinilla (2017) did to fill gaps when unable to find official national consumption statistics, except they use not just current-year production but rather the average of that plus the two previous years' production. That calculation not only smooths the time series but also captures the reality that not all wine is consumed in the year of production.
Especially in the case of reds it is common to let the wine mature first in barrels and then in bottles, and then even after sale from the winery it may be stored for some time by wholesalers, retailers, restaurants and even households before being consumed. For the relatively new China market, however, we assume below that wine is consumed in the year of domestic production or import.
III. Alternative wine market statistics for Japan, China and Hong Kong
We begin with Japan, the most mature of these northeast Asian markets, before turning to the most important and fastest growing wine market in Asia, namely mainland China's. 3 Imports and exports of Hong Kong and Macao are also considered. Even though the latter are far smaller markets, they are related to China's via their re-exports, and they provide an indication of how other Asian countries' wine consumption might grow as their per capita incomes approach the high levels of those two customs territories.
A. Japan
No less than 43 of Japan's 49 prefectures produce grape wine, mostly by small wineries that grow their own grapes and do not blend their product with material from other regions or abroad (Takahashi et al. 2017) . While domestic wine produced in one region is seldom blended with wine produced in another region of Japan (see Appendix Table 1 ), wine is also 'produced' in a few prefectures with large ports (Kawasaki et al. 2011) . Firms in the latter prefectures bottle imported bulk wine and/or wine they make by adding sugar and yeast to imported unfermented grape juice concentrate (Shimamura 2008) . The front label of these bottles of wine declare they are produced in Japan, and although the back label notes that they may contain imported material, that note can be in a tiny font.
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Official wine production data for Japan were not always reported to the UN's FAO, so for some years FAO inserted unofficial data The annual volumes of Japanese wine production, consumption and trade according to these official data are reported in Table 1 (a). If we define 'apparent consumption' as the sum of net imports plus the 3-year average of production in that and the two preceding years, then it is shown in that table to be quite close to the National Tax Agency estimate of Japan's consumption. The 'apparent consumption' data suggest Japan's annual per capita consumption of wine has grown from below 0.3 litres as of 1975 (0.4 in 1975-79) to almost 3 litres by 2016. They also suggest Japan's wine self-sufficiency has fallen from 75% in 1975 (62% in 1975-79) to 28% by 2016.
[ Table 1 about here]
Since the data in Table 1 (a) overstate consumption and self-sufficiency to the extent imported material are included in the domestic production estimate, two adjustments need to be made. One is to make the very reasonable assumption that all wine imported in bulk containers is blended with domestic wine and/or sold in bottles front-labelled 'Product of Japan' and recorded as such by the statistician. That adjustment brings per capita consumption down to 2.7 rather than 2.9 litres and self-sufficiency down to 23% rather than 28% for 2016 (Table 1( 
Furthermore, it is necessary to separate domestic wine production wine made from imported grape juice concentrate from that derived by fermenting fresh local grapes. Precise estimates of wine production from local grapes are available for 2013, 2014 and 2015 (14.3, 15 .1 and 16.9 ML, respectively -see National Tax Agency (2017) and earlier editions).
Those volumes average just one-fifth of the volumes in JETRO (1998) , that less than 10% of wine bottled in Japan is made from domestically produced grapes.
The extent of the impact of all these adjustments on estimates of Japan's wine consumption per capita and on its self-sufficiency in wine are shown graphically in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 about here]
B. China (mainland)
The annual volumes of wine production, consumption and trade according to official data, reported in Table 2 (a), suggest China's per capita consumption has grown from below 0.2 litres up until the turn of the century to 1.28 litres by 2016. They also suggest China's wine self-sufficiency has fallen from 100% in 1995-96 to 64% by 2016.
Much of the wine that is imported by China in bulk containers is bottled as is or blended with domestic wine and sold in bottles labelled 'Product of China'. If all such imported bulk wine was recorded as Chinese production by the statistician, then per capita consumption would have reached just 1.17 rather than 1.28 litres by 2016, and self-5 Most documents written in Japan, such as Takahashi et al. (2017) , use official data and so their quoted per capita consumption and self-sufficiency numbers are the higher ones in Table 1 . Takahashi et al. (2017) is the first introductory book in English on the Japanese wine industry and wineries. 6 While data are available on unfermented (non-alcoholic) grape juice concentrate imports by Japan (Harmonised System code 200961 and 200969), the factor needed to convert those tonnes into litres of wine with 12% alcohol is impossible to know because it depends on the brix content of each shipment of concentrate. During 2010-16, the value of Japan's imports of grape juice concentrate averaged 7.4% of the value of its wine imports.
sufficiency would be 61% rather than 64% (Table 2 (b)). These alternative numbers for this adjustment are lower-bound estimates because they have removed all of the imported bulk wine from the official 'production' data, whereas in practice some of that wine may have carried a correct country of origin label and not been counted as domestic production.
Furthermore, if there is double-counting of domestic wine production because it is internally traded between provinces in bulk before being bottled but counted as output in the source province as well as the desination province, per capita consumption and selfsufficiency would be even lower than official data suggest. For example, if domestic production is only two-thirds that recorded as official production, in addition to imported bulk wine being counted as product of China, then per capita consumption in 2016 would have reached only 0.89 litres rather then 1.28 litres and self-sufficiency would be 49% rather than 64% (Table 2 (c)). This is close to the suggestion made by one of China's leading wine reporters, having discussed the issue and its possible contributing factors with leading industry insiders (Boyce 2017) .
Finally, in addition to some recorded imports to Hong Kong and Macao being subsequently recorded as re-exported to China, it is believed that a portion also is transported to the mainland without being recorded, that is, it is smuggled so as to avoid one or more of China's three taxes on wine consumption. If the extent of such smuggling amounted to half as much again as Hong Kong has been re-exporting officially, 7 that would mean 2% higher consumption in China but the self-suffiency rate would be an extra percentage point lower (compare Table 2 (c) and Table 2 (d)).
The extent of the impact of these adjustments on estimates of China's wine consumption per capita and on its self-sufficiency in wine are shown in Figure 2 (where the adjustment including some smuggling is not shown as it is very close to the heavy black lines); and the extent of their impact on estimated production in China of wine if narrowly defined to be made from local grapes are shown in Figure 3 (along with similarly adjusted production estimates for Japan).
[ Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 about here] 7 The extent of such smuggling is unknowable, but informed commentators believe it has been non-trivial. See, for example, the comments by numerous key players in the Hong Kong market that were collated by Robinson (2018) 
C. Hong Kong and Macao
If Hong Kong's wine exports to China are in fact larger than shown in official records, it makes a much bigger difference to Hong Kong's apparent wine consumption per capita than to China's. To use the previous example, if the extent of such smuggling amounted to half as much again as Hong Kong has been re-exporting officially, then Hong Kong's apparent consumption is only 3.0 instead of 4.9 litres per capita in 2015-16 (Table 3) . That is much closer to the average annual consumption level in Singapore in recent years of 2.4 litres.
[ Table 3 about here]
Macao has less than one-tenth the population and hence a much smaller economy than Hong Kong, but it has had a similarly high and rapidly rising per capita income and demand for wine imports, and a similar proximity to mainland China. It abolished its 15% wine import tax in August 2008, six months after Hong Kong. Its apparent per capita consumption of wine, when defined as recorded net imports, have been about twice that of Hong Kong's over the past two decades. However, its recorded re-exports have been a far smaller proportion of its reported imports than is the case for Hong Kong (Table 3) . If there is no smuggling out of Macao, then it has by far the highest per capita wine consumption in Asia at more than twice Hong Kong's, three times Japan's, and four times Singapore's. That seems unlikely, however, notwithstanding the possibly considerable consumption by high-income gambling tourists in Macao (most of whom come from the mainland). A more-likely explanation for these comparative data is that a large share of Macao's wine imports have [ Figure 4 about here]
IV. Implications of revised statistics for wine exporters
These alternative estimates of wine market statistics for northeast Asia alter non-trivially the estimates of the share of wine in the region's alcohol consumption. Those shares are already presumed to be very low by world standards, but the above adjustments mean they may be even lower than previous estimates suggest. Nonetheless, since the turn of the century, even these alternative estimated shares have doubled for China, and gone up by about 50% for Hong Kong and Japan, at a time when wine's share of alcohol consumption in the rest of the world has shrunk by about one-quarter (Table 4) . Little wonder that the world's wine exporters are paying close attention to sales in this region, which is one of the fastest growing globally (Anderson and Wittwer 2015) .
[ Tables 4 and 5 These alternative estimates mean foreign suppliers may face considerably less competition in the Chinese and Japanese markets from local producers than official data imply. They also suggest the potential for increased per capita consumption in the region is even greater than previously thought, including in Hong Kong. True, these alternative estimates also suggest the rise in the share of the region in global wine consumption since the turn of the century has been overstated. That increase, from 2.9% to 8.4%, becomes one from 2.2% to 6.3% using these alternative estimates ( Import blend' assumes all of China's bulk imports each year are blended with domestically produced wine before being bottled and sold as Product of China; 'Import and regional blend' assumes domestically produced wine is only 2/3 rds of the official amount because of double counting due to wine of one region being blended in another region and counted by both regions, before imported bulk wine is blended into the mix prior to bottling.
Source: See a The final two columns assume consumption equals net imports plus the average of production in that and the previous two years. b The official consumption estimates are from the National Tax Agency (2016). c The share of bulk in total wine imports in 1975-87 is assumed to be 35%, the same as in 1988. d Production from local grapes, once grape juice concentrate is taken into account, is assumed to be one-fifth of production shown in Table 1 (b), the same as the average share in 2013-15, the only years for which actual data are available from the National Tax Agency (2016). e In Table 1 (c) self-sufficiency is just production from local grapes as a % of apparent consumption (with the latter including wine made from imported grape juice concentrate).
Sources: see text. a Assuming China's wine production is 2/3 rds of official estimate, and all bulk imports into China are blended with local wine, and the volume of wine smuggled into China is equal to an extra 50% of Hong Kong's total official wine re-exports.
b Assuming the volume of wine smuggled from Hong Kong to China is equal to an extra 50% of Hong Kong's total official wine re-exports.
c Assuming all imported bulk wine is bottled in and sold as product of Japan.
Source: Base estimates are from Anderson and Pinilla (2017) ; other estimates are based on the assumptions in Tables 1, 2 and 3 above. Tables 1(c) and 2(b) above plus the global estimated production and consumption in Anderson and Pinilla (2017) .
